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CHAPTER 13 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN MATTERS OF 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 
NIGEL D. WHITE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ALTHOUGH the Security Council has the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
peace and security’,1 and is granted an impressive array of powers under Chapters VI and 
VII of the UN Charter; the General Assembly has competence to make recommendations 
to the Security Council and to the Mmember Sstates on ‘any questions or any matter 
within the scope of the present Charter’,2 thereby having a secondary competence in 
matters of peace and security. As clearly stated by the International Court of Justice in the 
Expenses opinion delivered in 1962, the ‘responsibility conferred’ on the Security 
Council is ‘primary’ not ‘exclusive’, and the Charter ‘makes it abundantly clear’ that the 
General Assembly is ‘also to be concerned with international peace and security’.3 
The purpose of this chapter will be to understand and explore this division of 
competence as it has evolved since the inception of the UN Charter in 1945. It also aims 
to explore this division within the context of the prohibition on the use of force. While it 
                                                          
1 UN Charter, Article 24(1), UN Charter. 
2 UN Charter, Article 10, UN Charter. 
3 Please cite in full—full. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 
2, of the Charter), (Advisory Opinion, 1962 ICJ Rep 1962, 151, at  163. 
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is clear that the Security Council can authorizse the use of force by states, as an express 
Charter exception to the prohibition there is disagreement as to whether the General 
Assembly can recommend that states take military action, for instance when the Council 
is deadlocked and the UN is faced with an imminent and catastrophic use of force or act 
of violence. To examine this conundrum, the debate over the legality of the (in)famous 
Uniting for Peace Rresolution of 1950, will be revisited within the context of the 
emergence of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
II. PURPOSES AND POWERS OF THE UN 
The primary or, more accurately, the first-listed purpose of the United Nations is: 
‘To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches 
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity 
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace’.4 
If any organizsation is to fulfil its purposes it must have the legal personality, 
competence, and powers to achieve these goals, or certain aspects of them. This could be 
the power to recommend that member Sstates behave in a certain way, or it could be the 
legal power to bind member Sstates to so behave, with the power to impose sanctions 
(expulsion, suspension, denial of certain rights and privileges, boycotts, economic 
                                                          
4 UN Charter, Article 1(1), UN Charter. 
measures, and military measures) on those members that do not comply. Furthermore, 
those powers might be delegated to differing organs within the organizsation. 
The recently re-emerged ‘orthodoxy’ that organizsations should be limited to 
those powers, expressly delegated to it by the founding states and those that are strictly 
necessary to read into the text to give effect to the express powers,5 represents an attempt 
to restrict the constitutional growth of organizsations. Such a view is very much in the 
tradition of viewing organizsations as the servants of their creators (the founding states). 
According to this vision, states have created organizsations by an act of free will and they 
cannot thereafter be restricted in the subsequent exercise of their free will by their 
creations, unless they have clearly agreed to such limitations, in the express grant of 
competences or by necessary implication.6 However, one is reminded at this point of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s memorable reflection on the human condition: ‘l’homme est né 
libre, et partout il est dans les fers’ (‘man is born free but everywhere is in chains’).7 If a 
condition of pure freedom between states ever existed on the international plane (and 
there is little evidence that this was the case), then it was restricted upon the agreement of 
the first treaty, more so by emergence of customary rules of international law, and 
significantly further by the creation of international organizsations not based on 
unanimity. Furthermore, while a narrow approach to powers may be applicable to 
specialized agencies such as the World Health Organizsation (WHO), it has not been 
                                                          
5 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, (Advisory 
Opinion), 1996 ICJ Rep 1996, 66, at 78–79. 
6 J.an Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 73. 
7 Jean-J.acques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social (Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1966), 41. 
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applied to the UN itself. Thus, a contrast can be made between those liberal 
interpretations of the UN’s powers in matters of peace and security found in judgments of 
the International Court of Justice, such as on the Reparations and Expenses cases,8 with 
the narrow view of the powers of the specialized agencies found in the Court’s response 
to a request for an advisory opinion by the WHO on the Legality of the Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict.9 
An organiszation with a broad constitutional base, such as the UN, means that 
though states may control the creation of the organiszation, once created it can develop a 
significant separate will. Although state representatives sit in the organs, the fact of 
majority rule, and the interpretation of the mandates of organs by entities and individuals 
working within the organiszation, signify that it is no longer in the control of each state. 
The establishment of a constitutional order signifies the importance of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter—found in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2. These express the 
object and purpose of the Charter, and delineate the maximum extent of constitutional 
growth. Thus, the practice of the various organs as a means of developing and protecting 
these purposes and principles becomes important, as does the implication of powers, 
though not expressly granted, to achieve the aims of the organiszation.10 The text 
                                                          
8 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, (Advisory 
Opinion), 1949 ICJ Rep 1949, 174, at 182–183; Certain Expenses, Advisory Opinion, 
above note 3 at 168. 
9. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory 
Opinion, above note 5 at 78–79. 
10 J.osé E. Alvarez, ‘Constitutional Interpretation in International Organizations’, in 
J.ean-M.arc Coicaud and V.eijo Heiskanen (eds), The Legitimacy of International 
Organizations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001), 104, at 136–137. 
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becomes less important, but there are still clear legal limits as set by the constitution. For 
instance, Article 2(7) states that nothing in the Charter permits the UN to intervene within 
the domestic affairs of states and thus represents a restriction on the competence of the 
UN, though its scope has been narrowed over the years.11 Both the Security Council and 
the General Assembly have increasingly intervened in the internal affairs of states, 
tackling issues such as the denial of human rights and self-determination on the basis that 
abuse can constitute a danger or threat to the peace, when asserting competence over 
matters of peace and security, or on the basis that the promotion and development of 
human rights and self-determination is, in itself, within the purposes and competence of 
the UN. 12 Thus, the Charter is a living instrument—it evolves and develops—thereby 
enabling it to keep pace with developments in the international order. 
Constitutional documents such as the UN Charter go through different stages of 
evolution as the surrounding politics and the underlying balance of power change. The 
expansion of the competence of the General Assembly during the Cold War, evidenced 
early on in the enactment of the Uniting for Peace rResolution in 1950,13 is paralleled by 
the expansion in competence of the Security Council after the end of the Cold War. The 
latter does not somehow cancel out the former, but it does mean that advances in 
competence made by the General Assembly during the Cold War years are unlikely to be 
utiliszed in the post-Cold War era, when the Security Council is so dominant politically. 
                                                          
11 Gerog. Nolte, ‘Article 2(7)’, in B.runo Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 171. 
12 UN Charter, Articles 1(2), 1(3), 55, and 56, UN Charter. 
13 Uniting for Peace, UNGA Res 377 (1950). 
III. THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE, THE UN, AND 
PEACE AND SECURITY 
The prohibition on the threat or use of force is the most important principle in the UN 
Charter. The absence of widespread use of force by members, as well as the presence of a 
centraliszed and legitimate monopoly on the use of violence, are the basic elements for 
the survival of any society. Since Article 2(4) purports to control the threat or use of force 
by stating a norm of international law to which states must conform, and the Security 
Council is concerned with maintaining international peace by, inter alia, taking action 
against states using force in contravention of Article 2(4), it is plausible to examine the 
possibility of a correlation between Article 2(4) and the competence of the Security 
Council. One possible (narrow) approach is to restrict the Security Council’s coercive 
competence under Chapter VII to threats or uses of force prohibited by Article 2(4). 
Following from this, Chapter VI empowers the Council to deal with potential breaches, 
whereas Chapter VII allows it to deal with actual breaches of Article 2(4). Indeed, further 
to this argument there is a direct relationship between the concept of ‘threat of force’ 
under Article 2(4) and the concept of ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39, and that of 
‘use of force’ under Article 2(4) and those of ‘breach of the peace’ or ‘act of aggression’ 
under Article 39. Such a thesis envisages that the Charter established a ‘closed’ rather 
than an ‘open’ system. The Security Council’s competence would be defined, at its limits, 
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
by Article 2(4); and to determine that a situation was a ‘threat to the peace’ when it was 
not a ‘threat of force’ would be ultra vires.14 
Nevertheless, the Charter was neither constructed with such precision in mind, 
nor has it been interpreted in that manner. The trigger for Chapter VI, that the situation or 
dispute endangers international peace found in Article 34, is not confined to potential 
breaches of Article 2(4). Furthermore, the triggers for Chapter VII are not to be equated 
with breaches of Article 2(4) since the concern of the Security Council is with world 
peace and security, much broader notions than the threat of armed force or the actual use 
of armed force. This concern for peace and security spreads to issues such as the 
proliferation in armaments, the spread of terrorism, the disintegration of failed and failing 
states, massive flows of refugees, egregious violations of human rights—all issues that 
might threaten international peace and security, but all matters that fall outside of Article 
2(4).15 
IV. BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE UN, AND PEACE 
AND SECURITY 
Very few authors have argued that the Charter is ‘closed’ to the extent that the Security 
Council’s ultimate competence is defined by Article 2(4).16 Others have argued that the 
                                                          
14 N.igel D. White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 33–
36. 
15 R.üdiger Wolfrum, ‘Article 1’, in B. Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations, 
41–42. 
16 But see J.oachim Arntz, Der Begriff der Friendensbedrohung in Satzung und Praxis 
der Vereinten Nationen (1975), 63–64, 102–106. 
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Security Council’s competence is or should be triggered by breaches of international law, 
so that measures taken under Chapter VII are seen as sanctions for breaches of 
international law.17 While it is true that the Security Council has over recent decades 
responded to major breaches of humanitarian law for instance, and responded in ways 
that have led to the punishment of criminal behaviour, such as by the creation of criminal 
tribunals, but its core concern remains peace and security.18 Thus, a state possessing 
weapons of mass destruction may or may not be in breach of non-proliferation treaties 
and it may or may not represent a threat to international peace and security. The Security 
Council is concerned with the latter issue, so, for instance, it may decide that there is no 
threat even though an arms control treaty has been breached, or alternatively it may 
decide that there is a threat and that is evidenced in part by the breach of the treaty; or it 
might decide that there is a threat even though the treaty has not been breached.19 
Kelsen is of the opinion that it is ‘completely within the discretion of the Security 
Council as to what constitutes a threat to the peace’.20 Both Kelsen and Higgins state that 
because the Council is not fettered in its powers of determination under Article 39, such a 
determination can create new law as to what constitutes a threat to or breach of the 
                                                          
17 J.ost Delbrüuck, ‘The Impact of the Allocation of International Law Enforcement 
Authority on the International Legal Order’, in J.ost Delbruück (ed), The Allocation of 
Law Enforcement Authority in the International System (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 
1995), 135 at 158; V.era Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Introduction’ in V.era Gowlland-Debbas 
(ed), United Nations Sanctions and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001), 7–9. 
18 Tadicć, Case No. IT-94-1-T (1995) para 19 (ICTY Appeals Chamber). 
19 See egfor example UNSC Res 1718 (2006) on North Korea; UNSC Res 1737 (2006) 
on Iran. 
20 H.ans Kelsen, Law of the United Nations (London: Stevens, 1951), 727. 
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peace.21 It can be seen from this that the Council has a lawmaking role, but it does not 
necessarily follow that the Council is unfettered by international and Charter law. After 
all, the idea that key actors in international law are both lawmakers and subjects of the 
law is not new. While states accept obligations on a consensual basis in a bilateral or 
multilateral exchange with other states, at least in the pure Westphalian model of 
international law, the Security Council seems to be able to impose obligations without 
any reciprocal obligations being imposed on it. However, this seems to disregard the fact 
that, according to Article 24, the Security Council acts on behalf of member states, 
suggesting at least some form of reciprocal relationship, and that in so doing it is required 
to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, agreed to by all 
member states. Article 1 includes as a purpose of the UN the maintenance of peace and 
security by means of collective measures if necessary, but also the promotion and 
encouragement of respect for human rights. Thus, even within the UN Charter, hard 
security concerns run alongside human rights, so that when fulfilling its primary purpose, 
the UNSCouncil must have regard to human rights. As will be seen, the Assembly too 
has a concern for both peace and security, and for human rights and self-determination, 
and though it does not have mandatory powers in these fields, it is governed in the 
exercise of its powers by the purposes and principles of the Charter, as well as any 
express limitations. 
The UN, in both the Security Council and the General Assembly has, in practice, 
manifested a preference for an open system. In particular, it has applied the concept of a 
                                                          
21 R.osalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs 
of the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 266. 
‘threat to the peace’ in Article 39 to essentially internal situations.22 Arntz argues that 
internal situations are not within the ambit of Article 39 because they do not constitute a 
‘threat of force’ against another Sstate within the meaning of Article 2(4). He argues that 
the text of the Charter, particularly the pPreamble and Article 1, indicate that peace is the 
antithesis of war, and so the Charter only deals with threats to or breaches of inter-state or 
international peace, and not to intra-state or internal peace.23 However, the evidence is 
that if an internal situation or conflict such as found relatively early in the life of the UN, 
in the Congo and Southern Rhodesia in the 1960s,24 is serious enough to threaten 
international peace and security then the Security Council will become involved. 
ThusHence, although there may be an overlap between the competences of UN organs 
and the rules on the use of force, the concern of the former is so much broader—the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
V. THE UN AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
In the broader context of international law, a strong argument can be made that the 
Security Council ought to act to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, and other 
egregious violations of human rights, either because there is a duty on states and 
therefore on other actors possessing rights and duties to act within their legal 
                                                          
22 See eg, for example, UNSC Res 418 (1977) on South Africa. The General Assembly 
had determined that the situation in South Africa constituted a threat to the peace in 
1965–—UNGA Res 2054 (1965). 
23 Arntz, Der Begriff der Friendensbedrohung in Satzung und Praxis der Vereinten 
Nationenabove note 16 at, 63–64. 
24 UNSC Res. 161 (1961) re the Congo; UNSC Res. 232 (1966) re Southern Rhodesia. 
competences to prevent such violations of international law,25 or simply because such 
actions inherently undermine peace and security—they are antithetical to global order as 
well as being international crimes. However, given the Council’s primary responsibility 
for peace, there may be problems in placing a further responsibility upon it, especially if, 
in a particular instance, a military action to a prevent crimes against humanity actually 
worsens the security situation and endangers world peace. 
Nonetheless, in 2011 the Council took action to tackle crimes against humanity in 
the context of increasing violence within Libya. During the meeting at which Resolution 
1973 (2011) on Libya was adopted,26 the unanimity behind Resolution 1970 (in which the 
Security Council imposed non-forcible measures on Libya and Libyan leaders and 
referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC)) was broken, but not to 
the extent of disabling the adoption of Resolution 1973 by 10 votes to 0 with 5 
abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russia). Those abstaining were not only the 
usual advocates of non-intervention (China and Russia) but important states, each with a 
strong case for permanent membership themselves. 
The political change within the Council from the situation in Kosovo in 1999 
when it could not agree on military action to protect the Kosovars,27 to Libya in 2011 was 
marginal, but sufficient to give the initial NATO action by the North Atlantic Treaty 
                                                          
25 See Art I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 1948 which obligates states parties to ‘prevent and punish’ the crime of 
genocide. 
26 UNSC 6498th mtg (2011). 
27 See UNSC Res 1199 (1998); UNSC Res 1203 (1998) on the situation in Kosovo. 
Neither resolution expressly authorizsed ‘necessary measures’ to protect the people of 
Kosovo. 
Organization (NATO) in Libya a sound legal basis. That marginal push may have been 
helped by the emergence in the early 21st century of the idea that there is a responsibility 
to protect (R2P) on the part of the international community, when a state has failed to 
protect its population from crimes against humanity or other similar egregious acts.28 The 
UN World Summit Outcome Document of 2005 placed this responsibility on the 
government of the state, but then on the Security Council if the government failed to 
protect its population from genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes..29 Both 
Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya stated in the pPreamble that the Libyan 
authorities bore responsibility to protect the population of Libya, which could be seen as 
a reference to R2P, though tellingly neither Rresolution went on to state that since the 
Libyan government had failed to protect its population, the Security Council had a 
responsibility to do so. Instead, the Council seemed to be exercising its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, its traditional 
concern, making no reference to any other form of responsibility it might have. While 
there is no doubt that the Libyan crisis will be lauded as a precedent for R2P, the 
resolutions themselves do not support such an interpretation. At most, in the face of an 
imminent and brutal attack on the city of Benghazi, R2P arguments may have helped to 
persuade wavering permanent members not to veto the resolution authorizsing necessary 
measures to protect civilians and civilian- populated areas. 
                                                          
28 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The 
Responsibility To Protect (Ottowa: International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 
2001); Report of the High- Level Panel, A More Secure World (2004), recommendation 
55; Report of the UNSGSecretary-General, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, 
Development and Freedom for All’ (2005), para 135. 
The obvious weakness in placing a responsibility to respond to specific acts of 
violence on a body in which a veto can block any effective action, leads to the question of 
whether there are legitimate and lawful configurations of states that can fulfil the 
responsibility to protect on behalf of the international community. In other words, when 
the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of imminent and catastrophic violence can 
other security institutions, principally the General Assembly and regional organizsations, 
authorizse necessary measures to prevent such violence? The potential R2P role of the 
Assembly will be returned to after considering its competence for matters of peace and 
security under the Charter in the next section, which not only relates those powers but 
discusses the sometimes fraught relationship between the Assembly and the Council in 
matters of peace and security. 
VI. DIVISION OF COMPETENCE UNDER THE CHARTER 
Normally the constitutive treaty of an international organizsation provides for a division 
of competence between organs. Occasionally it is argued that this is or should be along 
the lines of the separation of powers, with one organ being given executive powers, and 
another judicial, another legislative.30 However, this pure form of separation is rarely 
found at the international level. Rather, the constitutive treaties divide and arguably 
balance powers between organs. The division of competence between the ‘primary’ organ 
for international peace and security, the Security Council, and the General Assembly has 
been a constant source of contention since the Korean War in 1950. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
29 World Summit Outcome Document, UNGA Res. 60/1 (2005), para 139. 
30 M.atthew Happold, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the 
United Nations’, (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 593. 
The powers of the Security Council are relatively clearly delineated in Chapters 
VI and VII of the UN Charter, with the former containing a range of recommendatory 
powers in relation to the peaceful settlement of disputes or situations that might endanger 
the peace, including fact- finding and recommending methods of adjustment or terms of 
settlement.31 The powers contained in Chapter VII, to demand provisional measures such 
as cease-fires, to take a range of non-forcible measures including economic sanctions, 
and to take military action,32 are contingent upon the Security Council finding a ‘threat to 
the peace’, ‘breach of the peace’, or ‘act of aggression’.33 
The Security Council has been creative in developing a range of non-forcible 
measures beyond general and targeted sanctions to include the creation of international 
criminal tribunals and international territorial administrations.34 In taking military 
measures against aggressor states and in tackling threats to the peace, the Security 
Council has relied on a system of ‘coalitions of the willing’ acting under a broad 
mandate, in lieu of the express Charter scheme of special agreements by sStates under the 
control of the Military Staff Committee and ultimately the Security Council.35 Thus, the 
Security Council has significantly developed its competence in the field of peace and 
security, but the majority of these developments occurred after the end of the Cold War 
and with it the extended pernicious use of the veto. The first coalition of the willing was 
put in place by the Security Council in 1950 in response to North Korea’s attack on South 
                                                          
31 UN Charter, Articles 34, 36, 37, and 38 UN Charter. 
32 UN Charter, Articles 40, 41, and 42 UN Charter. 
33 UN Charter, Article 39 UN Charter. 
34 egFor example, UNSC Res 827 (1993) re ICTY: and UNSC Res 1244 (1999) re 
Kosovo. 
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Korea.36 It was dismissed as a historical aberration at the time and it remained so until the 
Cold War ended, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, and Operation ‘Desert Storm’ was 
authorizsed to take necessary measures to restore peace.37 The Ccoalition model has been 
used on many occasions since to tackle threats to the peace as well as the aggressions of 
North Korea and Iraq. 
During the Cold War, with the Security Council deadlocked most of the time, 
emphasis was switched to the General Assembly and its secondary responsibility for 
peace and security. Inevitably, there is a division of views on whether the General 
Assembly has wide or narrow competence. A wide view of the competence of the UN 
General Assembly would point to Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter. Article 10 empowers 
the Assembly to ‘discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present 
Charter or relating to the powers or functions of any organs provided for in the present 
Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the 
Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such 
questions or matters.’ As a resultThus, Article 10 establishes a general competence for 
the Assembly to discuss any matter within the remit of the United Nations as determined 
by the Charter.38 This power indeed makes the Assembly the ‘town meeting place of the 
world’, and ‘the open conscience of humanity’, as intended at San Francisco.39 It follows 
that its power to adopt recommendations on any such matter must also cover the same 
                                                                                                                                                                             
35 UN Charter, Articles 43-–7 UN Charter. 
36 UN SC Res 83 (1950) re Korea. 
37 UNSC Res 678 (1990) re Iraq. 
38 Ha.ns Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (London: Stevens, 1951), 198. 
39 Yearbook of the United Nations , (UN, 1946-4–7), 51. 
area as the more concrete recommendatory powers of the Security Council under 
Chapters VI and VII.40 
If Article 10 is insufficient to grant the Assembly the full range of 
recommendatory powers, Article 14 re-emphasizses its potentially wide jurisdiction with 
specific reference to international security by providing that ‘subject to the provisions of 
Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment 
of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare 
or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the 
present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’. Article 
14 with its jurisdictional threshold of a situation deemed ‘likely to impair the general 
welfare or friendly relations among nations’ appears to give the Assembly access to a 
much wider range of situations in the field of international peace and security than the 
Security Council. The Assembly can, under Articles 10 and 14, discuss situations covered 
by Articles 34 and 39, but to prevent any clash between the work of the Security Council, 
which is primarily concerned with such situations, and the General Assembly, Article 14, 
as well as Article 10, are subject to the limitation contained in Article 12. Article 12(1) 
provides that the ‘General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to 
that dispute or situation’ while the Council is ‘exercising in respect of any dispute or 
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter’. In practice, the Assembly 
                                                          
40 Kay Hailbronner and Eckart Klein, ‘Article 10’, in Simma (ed), The Charter of the 
United Nations, 264. 
often adopts resolutions on a matter at the same time at which the Security Council is 
considering the question.41 
It seems to have been accepted practice at least in the early life of the UN that 
when an item was placed on the Security Council’s agenda it was deemed to be 
exercising its functions in accordance with Article 12(1). The theory behind the list of 
matters which the Secretary General submits to the General Assembly is that it tells the 
Assembly which issues it is not allowed to discuss because they are receiving attention in 
the Security Council. In effect, this approach amounted to defining ‘functions’ in Article 
12(1) with reference to Article 12(2). 
The procedure in which the list of matters seized by the Security Council was also 
deemed to contain those matters in relation to which it is exercising the functions 
assigned to it may have been accepted at a very formal level, but in practice it has been 
disregarded. Western sStates could use their early dominance of both organs in the first 
decade to remove, by procedural vote, items from the agenda of the Security Council, 
where the Soviet veto might have been preventing action being taken, to put the issue 
before the Assembly.42 
Whereas the Western sStates could use this method of transferring issues from the 
Council to the Assembly during the early Cold War period, the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), once it became an established force in the 1960s, was not assured of winning a 
procedural vote in the Council and so in practice it tended to ignore procedural 
                                                          
41 Hailbronner and Klein, ‘Article 12’, in Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations, 
290. 
42 See the Greek Question (1947-–8) discussed in White, Keeping the Peace, above note 
14, 153–154. 
technicalities. In view of the importance of the United Nations to the NAM, it was not 
surprising that they took the attitude that their disregard of a technical procedure adopted 
during a period of Western domination was no more reprehensible than the manipulation 
by the West of the same procedure during the earlier period. Indeed, the Assembly’s 
approach breaks what in many ways was an artificial link between Article 12(2) and 
12(1). The approach developed during the Cold War was that the Assembly would decide 
for itself whether the Council was functioning within the meaning of Article 12(1), 
thereby instituting a crude form of political accountability in the organizsation. This 
attitude to Article 12 has been maintained despite the ending of the Cold War, and seems 
to have received the qualified endorsement of the International Court in 2004 in its 
advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory.43 Nevertheless, with the Security Council now 
‘functioning’ more or less continuously and dealing positively with many issues brought 
before it, the Assembly has considerably fewer opportunities to assert its authority. 
Articles 10 and 14 empower the General Assembly to discuss and make 
recommendations on matters which may be a danger to international peace within the 
meaning of Article 34, Chapter VI, or which constitute a threat to or breach of the peace 
within the meaning of Article 39, Chapter VII. Since these are the jurisdictional 
thresholds to the Security Council’s competence in the field of international peace and 
security, there is a large area of overlap between the two organs. It is clear from Article 
24(1) that the Security Council has ‘primary responsibility’ for peace and security, a 
position that Articles 11 and 12 of the UN Charter attempt to elaborate upon. Article 
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11(3) deals specifically with a situation which comes within Chapter VI, as defined by 
Article 34, by stating that the ‘General Assembly may call the attention of the Security 
Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace’. Article 11(3) 
seems to envisage the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction between the two organs in 
that it does not place an obligation on the Assembly to refer any such situation to the 
Council. 
Article 11(2) addresses the issue of whether the Assembly can purport to exercise 
any powers similar to those possessed by the Council under Chapter VII by providing 
that the Assembly ‘may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security brought before it’ and ‘may make recommendations with regard to 
any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both’. 
However, Article 11(2) then crucially provides that ‘any such question on which action is 
necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before 
or after discussion’. 
Article 11(2) accords the General Assembly a general competence in peace and 
security and thereby empowers it to find a ‘threat to the peace’, a ‘breach of the peace’, 
or an ‘act of aggression’ and to make recommendations thereon to restore international 
peace, a power concurrent with that of the Security Council under Article 39, and one 
utilizsed by the Assembly in practice (reviewed in Section VIIIbelow). Though objected 
to by a minority of members,44 such a power is reconcilable with the Charter. It is a 
recommendatory power only, any coercive measures under Chapter VII requiring a 
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mandatory decision can only be adopted by the Security Council.45 Support for this 
interpretation of Article 11(2) can be found in the Expenses opinion of 1962, though the 
Court considered the measures under review (namely peacekeeping forces in the Middle 
East and in the Congo) were based on the consent of the states in question and therefore 
did not constitute coercive measures against states. However, in its more abstract 
discussion of powers, the Court stated that ‘only the Security Council . . . can require 
enforcement by coercive action’, and further that ‘it is the Security Council which, 
exclusively, may order coercive action’.46 It follows from this that the Assembly can go 
asso far as to recommend action by the Security Council, or to suggest voluntary 
sanctions, or further to recommend military measures.47 There is a limited amount of 
General Assembly practice to support this contention (reviewed in Section VIIIbelow), 
although the power to recommend military measures has not been utilizsed in the full 
sense, and in the current post-Cold War climate, has become more a theoretical, rather 
than, a practical issue. The fact remains, however, that the General Assembly does 
appear, on balance, to have this power and it is not impossible to envisage a situation in 
which its future use may be considered. 
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1962’, (1962) 11 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1169, at 1173; J.uraj 
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Nevertheless, the power of the Assembly to recommend economic or military 
action is controversial in that in the original Charter scheme the only way in which the 
United Nations could undertake economic or military action was by a mandatory decision 
of the Security Council under Articles 41 or 42. It is argued that since the UN has the 
power to order military action, then it must have the lesser power to recommend military 
action, and once this recommendatory power is recognizsed there is nothing in the 
Charter which prohibits the Assembly as well as the Council from exercising it. This 
contention, however, disguises the fact that recommendatory military action allows for 
the potential of greater abuse by member sStates, but it is the model that has in effect 
been adopted by the UN. Though it is practice for the Security Council to ‘authorizse’ 
military action, the difference between this power and that belonging to the General 
Assembly to ‘recommend’ military action may be more than semantic,48 but does not 
mean that the Security Council has ‘required’ or ‘ordered’ coercive military action. The 
reality is that under both the ‘authorizsation’ and ‘recommendation’ versions of the 
decentralized military option developed by the Security Council, states volunteer their 
forces to the UN for military action, and volunteering states decide on the extent of their 
commitment to the cause within the terms of the mandate and subject to a duty to report 
to the mandating organ on measures taken. 
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VII. DIVISION OF COMPETENCE IN PRACTICE 
The reference in Article 14 to the purposes and principles of the United Nations explains 
the development of one of the major roles of the General Assembly—the shaping of the 
right to self-determination referenced in Article 1(2). While the Security Council is 
established to further the first-listed purpose of the UN in Article 1(1), namely the 
maintenance of international peace and security;, the Assembly’s functions extend to 
cover the development and promotion of self-determination in Article 1(2) and human 
rights in Article 1(3),49 in addition to its secondary competence in peace and security as 
evidenced in Articles 10 and 11. The division between peace and security on the one 
hand, and human rights and self-determination on the other, does not exclude the Security 
Council, as primary organ for peace and security, from dealing with violations of human 
rights and self-determination whenever the peace is threatened, nor does it prevent the 
General Assembly as the main UN organ for human rights and self-determination from 
addressing matters of peace and security, particularly where violations of human rights 
are occurring. 
Another way of understanding the issue is to consider the purposes in Article 1 as 
defining the framework within which subsequent practice of the UN develops. Further 
limitations will be found in express prohibitions or limitations—for example, in Article 
2(7). The International Court of Justice recognizsed that the main limitation on the 
practice of the UN was the purposes of the organizsation when it stated in the Expenses 
case that ‘W[w]hen the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
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presumption is that such an action is not ultra vires’, 50 but it also discussed potential 
limitations on the powers of the Oorganization in the Charter, especially Article 11(2) as 
regards the General Assembly. 
Issues of peace and security often involve questions of self-determination and 
human rights and thus frequently both the Security Council and General Assembly are 
involved. Arguably, if the Council is functioning in relation to the issue, then the 
Assembly should only become involved if it concentrates on the issues of self-
determination and human rights, and it does not transgress any express limitations such as 
found in Article 11(2) with its limitation of ‘action’ to the Security Council. Confining 
the General Assembly in this way did not prove to be possible during the Cold War as the 
majority of members (excluding Western states) viewed the denial of self-determination 
in the colonial context as a threat to peace.51 
The example of Southern Rhodesia is dealt with at this stage, though a similar 
story emerges from the Assembly’s practice during the Cold War in relation to the 
Portuguese Territories, apartheid South Africa, and the question of Palestine.52 In the 
Southern Rhodesia situation, the Assembly was initially concerned with the failure to 
implement the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples,53 and not with problems of international peace and security.54 However, the 
Assembly moved beyond the issue of denial of self-determination in 1963 when it 
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determined that the failure to extend basic political rights to the ‘vast majority of the 
African population’, and the ‘entrenchment of the minority regime in power’ created an 
‘explosive situation’ which constituted a ‘threat to international peace and security’.55 It 
is arguable that after the Council had made a similar determination of a threat to the 
peace,56 and started taking measures against Southern Rhodesia following the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in 1965, the Assembly should have left the situation to be 
dealt with by the Council. Nonetheless, the Assembly kept up its pressure on the Council 
as well as the white minority regime until settlement of the situation in 1980.57 
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice confirmed the legality of 
Assembly practice as a means of interpreting its competence in 2004,58 which was given 
in response to a General Assembly request for a Court opinion concerning the legal 
consequences arising from the construction of a security wall in the occupied Palestinian 
territory in the light of the rules and principles of international law. The resolution was 
adopted during the Assembly’s reconvened 10th Emergency Special Session, and 
expressed its awareness of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by the use of 
force and the denial of the principle of self-determination.59 Thus, the Assembly 
combined its competence in matters of peace of security with its concern with issues of 
human rights and self-determination. The Court accepted the Assembly’s competence to 
do so under Articles 10 and 11, thereby endorsing its competence to determine a threat to 
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international peace and security.60 The Court stated that Assembly practice had moved 
towards consistently acting in ‘parallel’ with the same matter concerning international 
peace and security.61 Furthermore, the Court also stated that it was ‘often the case that, 
while the Security Council has tended to focus on aspects of such matters related to 
international peace and security, the General Assembly has taken a broader view, 
considering also their humanitarian, social and economic aspects’.62 The Court 
considered that this ‘accepted practice’ was consistent with the UN Charter specifically 
Article 12,63 and in so doing dismissed Israel’s argument that such practice was ultra 
vires as it argued that the Security Council was the body entrusted with matters of peace 
and security.64 
The question remains whether the General Assembly can step into the shoes of 
the Security Council not only to determine a threat to the peace, but to tackle issues that 
are primarily if not exclusively issues of peace and security by recommending measures, 
either non-forcible or forcible. The issue of military measures was raised during the 
Korean War (1950-–3), which will be discussed in the next section. Korea also involved 
one of the first instances of the Assembly recommending voluntary non-forcible 
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sanctions. These were instigated by the pro-Western majority and directed not only 
against the North Korea aggressors, but also against the Peoples’s Republic of China, 
which had entered the war when the US-led forces approached the Chinese border in their 
bid to unify the country, and involved an embargo on military supplies and equipment.65 
Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union declared that it viewed these sanctions as invalid since, 
it argued, they constituted ‘action’ within the competence of the Security Council 
according to Article 11(2).66 
Assembly practice during the Cold War consolidated this competence, though the 
instigators in this period were the NAM and Socialist majority. Voluntary sanctions were 
called for by the General Assembly in the cases of South Africa, the Portuguese 
Territories, and Southern Rhodesia.67 The Assembly’s power to recommend voluntary 
measures was confined to colonial or racist regimes, and the sanctions mentioned 
abovepreviously were terminated with the end of colonial or racist domination. However, 
by tying zionism to racism in 1975,68 the Assembly was able to subsequently justify 
recommending voluntary measures against Israel.69 A US-led campaign led to the 
‘repeal’ of the resolution that equated zionism to racism in 1991.70 
VIII. UNITING FOR PEACE 
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Controversy over the extent of the General Assembly’s competence, as well as the extent 
of its encroachment on the functions and powers of the Security Council, is often centred 
on the Uniting for Peace rResolution of 3 November 1950.71 The immediate reason for 
the adoption of the rResolution was the return, in August 1950, of the Soviet Union to the 
Security Council, leading to the discontinuation of the Council as the body able to 
address the Korean War. Previously, in the absence of the Soviet Union from the Council 
Chamber (in protest over the continued occupation of the Chinese permanent seat by the 
Nationalists instead of the Communists), the Council had recommended that the US-led 
Ccoalition take necessary measures to repel the attack of North Korea and to restore 
international peace and security to the area.72 In fact, the Assembly adopted an 
‘enforcement’ resolution on Korea after the Soviets had returned to the Security Council 
but before the Uniting for Peace rResolution was adopted.73 
In reality, the reasons for Uniting for Peace went beyond Korea, in that the 
Western- influenced majority in the General Assembly at the time was also of the view 
that the frequent use of the Soviet veto during the period 1946-–50 was an abuse of that 
right, and that the ideal of great power unanimity at San Francisco was no longer 
attainable. Western sStates wanted an alternative form of collective security, based not on 
permanent member agreement in the Security Council, but on the basis of the will of the 
majority in the Assembly. Such a concept of collective security, whilst opening up the 
potential for economic and military actions against transgressors, also had the potential, 
in theory, to allow the General Assembly to recommend military action against one of the 
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permanent members. A more likely scenario would be for the Assembly to recommend 
military action that would affect the interests of a permanent member. It may be because 
this system of collective security was so potentially dangerous in upsetting the underlying 
balance of power that existed in the Cold War that the Uniting for Peace rResolution 
restricted the Assembly’s power to recommend military measures to the most flagrant 
violations of international peace, namely breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, and 
did not expressly permit the Assembly to take such measures as a response to threats to 
the peace. 
The Soviet Union objected strongly to the Rresolution, in particular it argued that 
it violated the Charter requirement that coercive power was granted solely to the Security 
Council.74 In the Expenses case the Court stated that ‘action’, which is the preserve of the 
Security Council,75 refers to coercive action but it failed to state whether this excluded 
the Assembly from recommending coercive measures. At some points the Court 
suggested that ‘action’ was restricted to mandatory, coercive action ‘ordered’ by the 
Security Council. Thus, the Assembly did not appear to be barred from recommending 
enforcement action as part of its significant responsibility for the maintenance of peace as 
recognizsed by the Court.76 There was no provision that clearly prohibited the Assembly 
from adopting this resolution. Furthermore, despite the wording of the Uniting for Peace 
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rResolution, there appears to be no cogent argument against allowing the Assembly to 
recommend military measures to combat a threat to the peace.77 
There can be no doubt that Uniting for Peace was designed to enable the United 
Nations to achieve one of its primary purposes: the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security. In addition to fulfilling the UN’s purposes, such a power 
must also be consistent with the principles of the United Nations contained in Article 2. 
Although Article 2(7), prohibiting UN intervention in domestic affairs, only expressly 
exempts Chapter VII measures by the Security Council, there can be little doubt that 
threats to or breaches of the peace are not domestic matters to which the provision 
applies. More problematic for Uniting for Peace is the rule prohibiting the threat or use of 
force in international relations contained in Article 2(4), since if the Assembly is 
empowered to recommend states to use force, this appears to be a prima facie breach. The 
exceptions to Article 2(4) are explicitly stated in the UN Charter to be self-defence by 
states under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and military action taken (in practice 
authorizsed) by the Security Council under Articles 42 or 53. To state that the General 
Assembly can recommend military action arguably creates a third exception, which 
would appear to be contrary to Article 2(4), unless the General Assembly’s power is 
restricted to the endorsement of the right of individual or collective self-defence under 
Article 51. Such endorsement is not a legal requirement but may be sought to increase the 
legitimacy of any proposed military operation. Clearly the debates preceding the adoption 
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of Uniting for Peace showed that the envisaged power was not restricted to a legitimating 
function, whereby self-defence would be endorsed by the Assembly.78 
Furthermore, the argument that the Security Council was simply endorsing the 
right of self-defence in the Korean and Kuwait operations of 1950 and 1990 respectively 
is misconceived, shown by the fact that contributing, neutral, and target states, as well as 
crucial actors such as the UN Secretary- General, viewed both operations as United 
Nations military operations, not actions in self-defence.79 Though there is clearly an 
overlap between the right of self-defence under Article 51 and the power to take military 
action to restore peace and security under Article 42 when an armed attack/armed 
aggression has taken place, the legal basis of any military operation has to be judged by a 
combination of objective analysis of whether the necessary conditions for the exercise of 
the legal power are present, as well as the claims and reactions of states in relation to 
such military action. 
The Security Council in exercising its power under Chapter VII to authorizse 
military action acts on behalf of the membership of the United Nations,80 and so arguably 
the exceptions to the ban on force are those undertaken in legitimate self-defence and 
those authorizsed by organs representing the membership of the United Nations in 
matters of peace and security. The question of which organ within the UN authorizses 
them is an internal issue and does not affect the legitimacy of UN action visà-vis a 
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transgressing Sstate.81 This internal issue can be resolved in favour of both organs having 
the ability to authorizse (in the case of the Security Council) or recommend (in the case 
of the General Assembly) military action. It is submitted that the Assembly possessed a 
power to recommend military action in 1945, but its conversion from power in abstracto, 
to power in reality, has been achieved through the practice of the Assembly, including the 
Uniting for Peace rResolution. 
The Uniting for Peace rResolution, whereby the Assembly can be activated in the 
face of a deadlocked Security Council by means of a procedural vote in the Council that 
is not subject to the veto, has been used to gain UN authority for innovative military 
actions. In the face of a military intervention by two permanent members (France and the 
UK) in the Suez crisis of 1956, and in the face of a threat to the peace in the Congo in 
1960, which was in athe state of collapse, the Security Council, unable to take substantive 
action itself due to the veto, transferred the matter to the Assembly,82 which duly became 
the mandating organ in the case of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), a 
traditional peacekeeping force, and temporarily in the case of the United Nations 
Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which acted in a more muscular fashion. Although it 
may be argued that these two operations were more ‘peacekeeping’ than ‘enforcement’, 
and thus are not direct precedents for seeking an enforcement mandate, the reality was 
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September 1960) (USSR voted against). 
that the Congo operation constituted enforcement action against non-state actors 
(secessionist fighters and mercenaries).83 
In addition, the General Assembly had, even before the adoption of the Uniting 
for Peace rResolution, become involved in the direction of the Korean military 
enforcement operation. In fact, the Assembly made a substantial contribution to the UN -
mandated action in Korea by passing a resolution on 7 October 1950, which allowed the 
UN force to continue its military operations in order to establish ‘a unified, independent 
and democratic government of Korea’, after the Security Council had been deadlocked by 
the return of the Soviet representative.84 This Rresolution was seen as permitting the US-
led force’s crossing of the 38th parallel and so can be classified as recommending 
enforcement action. The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who was instrumental 
in the drafting of the Rresolution, saw it as essential to have the mandate from the UN for 
the non-defensive intervention in North Korea.85 
Though actual practice by the General Assembly in recommending that states take 
military action is extremely limited, the aboveprevious analysis has established that the 
Assembly has the power to make such recommendations, to combat threats to the peace 
as well as breaches and acts of aggression. The Assembly reluctance to exercise its 
powers is a reflection of the dominance of the Security Council in matters of peace and 
security, and increasingly in matters of international criminal law. However, when there 
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is strong evidence of a threat to the peace and of egregious violations of human rights, 
there are compelling reasons to recognizse that the Assembly needs to revive its 
apparently long-lost competence to recommend military action. In the face of genocide or 
crimes against humanity, both egregious violations of human rights that sit squarely in 
the remit of the General Assembly, and in the face of a deadlocked Security Council, the 
Assembly should come under increasing pressure to fulfil the UN’s responsibility to 
protect. 
It is somewhat ironic that a procedure advocated by Western Sstates in 1950 was 
conveniently ‘forgotten’ in the case of the Kosovo crisis of 1999, when Western states (in 
the form of NATO) threatened and then used force to end the crimes against humanity 
being committed by Serb forces. The threat of Chinese and Russian vetoes seemed to 
have blocked further Council action beyond non-forcible measures. The cumbersome 
nature of convening an emergency special session of the Assembly, which can be done 
by the Assembly itself, was not a legitimate excuse for failing to activate Uniting for 
Peace, given that NATO first threatened to use force without express authority in October 
1998 when the Assembly was meeting in its 53rd annual session. Canada briefly 
considered taking such an initiative,86 as apparently did the UK. The reasons for not 
doing so were not primarily legal but political—a fear of losing the vote and a fear of 
resurrecting a precedent that might be used against Western Sstates in the future, 
although the UK later stated that it doubted the legality of such a move.87 Uniting for 
                                                          
86 P.aul Heinbecker, ‘Kosovo’, in D.avid Malone (ed), The UN Security Council: From 
the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 543. 
87 House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 Nov. 1999, 63–64 (Emyr 
Jones Parry). But see 4th Report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 23 May 
Peace provokes controversy, not only out of legal concerns, but because it embodies a 
very different approach to collective security than that envisaged by the Security Council. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the legality of the Uniting for Peace 
rResolution was not really questioned when the Assembly utilizsed its reconvened tenth 
emergency special session in 2003 to request an advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the construction of a security wall in the 
occupied Palestinian territory, in which the Court determined that the construction of the 
security wall by Israel was illegal.88 In determining it had jurisdiction the Court was 
concerned, inter alia, with whether the conditions of the rResolution were satisfied rather 
than with the legality of Uniting for Peace itself.89 However, in determining that those 
conditions were; —firstly that the Council had failed to exercise its primary responsibility 
as a result of one or more vetoes, and, secondly, that the situation is one where there 
appeared to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’,90 —the 
Court was effectively endorsing the Assembly’s competence in matters of peace and 
security as contained in the Rresolution. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Assembly is a slumbering giant, in thrall to the smaller but sporadically powerful 
Council. While the Council is equipped with an impressive array of powers, their use is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2000, para. 128; I.an Brownlie and C.hristine J. Appleby, ‘Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: 
Memorandum on International Law Aspects’, (2000) 49 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 904. 
88 WallWall opinion, above note 43 at, Advisory Opinion, 197. 
89 WallIbid., Advisory Opinion, at 136. 
90 WallIbid., Advisory Opinion, 151–152. 
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
not guaranteed even though the Council has become much more active in the post-Cold 
War period. Its failure to act in Kosovo in 1999 and in Syria in 2012, either side of its 
humanitarian military action in Libya in 2011, puts in perspective the true nature of its 
‘responsibility’ to prevent and react to genocide and crimes against humanity. Such 
crimes were being committed in all three cases, and moreover all three were threats to the 
peace. In such situations, if a plan were to comeA plan coming from (a group of) member 
states and the Secretary- General involving peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or 
humanitarian action, and that plan were to be endorsed by the General Assembly,91 this 
would is neither be a breach of the Charter nor would it be is it confusing police action 
with issues of justice.92 Rather, it would be is a powerful form of collective security 
based on the principles of the Charter and on upholding the purposes of the United 
Nations.93 
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